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Abstract: In many macroeconomic models, agents  hold fiat money balances,
despite being rate-of-return dominated, to satisfy either a cash-in-advance
constraint or resewe requirements.  In this paper, I compare the allocations from
the two different  economies. Despite the inherent differences in these two
modelling approaches,  the alternative monetary envirorunents are equivalent in
the sense  that one can obtain identical equilibrium  allocations. This equivalence
result hold for a particular combination of monetary policy variables; that is,
namely, there is a combination policy characterized by the inllation  rate and
reserve requirement ratio such that the reserve-requirement model is equivalent
to other monetarv environments.
I have benefitted greatly from conversations with Jerry Dwyer, Scott Freeman, Rik Hafer, Greg
Huffrnan, Evan Koenig, Finn Kydland, and Carlos Zarazaga'  Such assistance,  however, should
not be interpreted as implicating these people as responsible for any remaining errors.  The
views expressed  herein do not necessarily  reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas  nor the Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  Svstem.1.  Introduction
In many economic environments, infinitety-lived  agents  hold.fiat money, despite being a
comparatively poor store of value, either because  they face a cash-in-advance  constraint, it saves
on transactions  costs,  or there is a reserve  requirement.r Woodford (1990),  and others,  have
demonstrated that models with money-in-the-utility function can be more explicitly represented
by models in which there is a cash-in-advance  constraint.  More generally, functional equivalence
will hold between the money-in-the-utility function and any model in which money is valued.2
The purpose of this paper is to ask, In what sense  are different monetary environments
equivalent?  In practice, I focus on comparing two environments: a model in which money is
held to satisff a cash-in-advance  constraint and a model in which a reserve requirement is
present.  I investigate the similarities between the alternative environments in terms of the
allocations obtained in a monetary equilibrium.  Thus, one contribution. of this paper is to detail
similarities between the model with a cash-in-advance  constraint and a model with a reserve
requirement.  In doing so, one also sees  the key differences between these two monetary
economies.
The main result in this paper is to show  that in steady-state,  identical  allocations  can  be
obtained from the two model economies. What is crucial for this equivalence  is the combination
of the inflation  rate and reserve requirement ratio.  More specifically, for a given inflation  rate,
one can analytically solve for the steady-state  level of capital and consumption in the cash-in-
' Well-known examples  of models in which a cash-in-advance  constraint is present include
Lucas  and Stokey  (1983),  Christiano  and Eichenbaum  (1992),  and Fuerst  (1992). See  Sargent
and Wallace  (1985),  Freeman  (1987),  and Smith (1991)  for models  in which reserve
requirements are present.  The 'traruactions costs' category is a very broad class  of models
intended  to include  alternative  modelling  strategies  such  as  Townsend's  (1980)  model with
spatially  separated  agents  and shopping-time  models,  such  as  the one specified  in Saving  (1971).
2 See Feenstra (1985) for development of the functional equivalence  between models with
money-in-the-utility  function and the class  of models  with transactions  costs.advance  model.  The identical capital-consumption allocation will be the solution in the reserve-
requirement model for the inflation  rate and a particular value of the reserve requirement ratio.
Though the equivalence result is obtained in the direct comparison of the cash-in-
advance  and reserve-requirement models, the rationale for holding money is not critical.  The
class  of monetary economies  that are equivalent to the reserve-requirement model (in the sense
described above) can be extended to include models in which the steady-state  level of capital is
between zero and the level obtained in a non-monetary economy. The trade-off between the
inflation  rate and the reserve requirement ratio plays a key role in the equivalence result.  In
the reserve-requirement model, monetary policy directly affects the real return on deposits.
There are literally  an infinite  number of inflation  rate-reserve requirement ratio combinations
that are consistent with the same real retum.  The flexibility inherent to the reserve-requirement
model means that the set of possible solutions for steady-state  capital is between zero and that
obtained in a non-monetary economy. Consequently,  the resewe-requirement model is
equivalent to a much broader class  of monetary economies  than the exdmple considered here.
I also consider equivalence in terms of seignorage  revenue in addition to allocations.  In
the economies studied here, only a few policy combinations satisry both allocation and
seignomge-revenue  equivalence. To keep seignorage  revenue equal across  different economies
it is necessary  to maintain both the tax rate and tax base. In this example, the tax base  differs
which imposes restrictions on the set of reserye requirements ratios that wilt yield seignorage-
revenue  equality.
In this paper,  I examine  a general  version  of the model developed  in Stocknan (1983)  in
which fiat money is required to purchase  the consumption good and capital.  The reserve-
requirement model is a hybrid model in which fiat money is required to purchase the
consumption good and to satisry a reserve requirement.  Thus, both models share the featurethat the consumption good is a cash good.  In addition, fiat money is required for capital
purchases  in both economies.
In comparing  the two.  economies,  I consider  two definitions  of equivalence.  In "model"
equivalence,  I compare the first-order conditions from the two alternative models, seeking the
set  of restrictions  that will result in the two sets  of first-order  conditions  being identical. I also
consider weaker notion, "allocation" equivalence which is satisfied if the two economies  have the
same equilibrium  quantities of capital and consumption.  I show that it would purely
coincidental for the conditions for model equivalence  to be satisfied and, indeed, would
generally fail to hold in a steady-state  allocation in which the capital stock is strictly positive.  As
noted above,  however, the two model economies  are allocation equivalent for a set of policy
combinations  .
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the economic environment for the
model with a cash-in-advance  constraint is developed and the equilibrium  is characterized. An
economy is specified in Section 3 in which there is a reserve requirement and a cash-in-advance
constraint on the consumption good.  In addition, I propose a strong definition  of equivalence,
showing that the two alternative environments generally will not satisry this definition.  In
Section 4, I focus on the steady-state  allocations of capital and consumption for the two models.
It  is possible to demonstrate that the two models will yield identical steady-state  allocations for a
particular combination of the reserve requirement ratio and inflation  rate.  The conditions are
derived in Section 5 for equivalent seignorage  revenue across  the two models that also meet the
equivalent allocation definition.  Section 6 then brieflv summarizes  the findinss.
2. The cash-in-advance  model
First, I will develop the model with the cash-in-advance  constraint.  The model has isessentially the one developed in Stoclanan,  with the cash-in-advance  constraint generalized to
let agents  finance a fraction their gross investment spending with credit.
Suppose  the economy is populated by a large number of infinitelyJived  agents  with
identical  preferences.  Time is indexed  t :0,  1,2,...,  The agent  seeks  to maximize  the
discounted value of utility,  represented as
E P'u(c,)
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where k denotes the stock of capital, m is the nominal quantity of fiat money balances,  r
denotes the quantity of fiat money balances  transferred at the beginning of date t, c is the
consumption  good sold for P pieces  of fiat money,  6 is the rate of capital  depreciation,  and md  isquantity of nominal money balances  that the agents  wishes  to carry over from date t to date
t+1.  In this setup, n represents the ftaction of gross  investment purchases  that is required to
have fiat money balances  in advance. With  n  :  1, equation (3) is the model is identical to the
one studied  in Stoclcnan  (1981),  whereas  with 11  :  0, the consumption  good is the only cash
good such as in the specifications used in Greenwood and Hufftnan  (1987) and Cooley and
Hansen  (1989).
Units of the consumption good are produced using the production technology captured
by the function f(.).  I assume  the production  function  has  the following  properties:  f(.)  > 0, fl'(.)
< 0, fl(O) :  co  and f(oo) :6.  Firms maximize  profits in a perfectly  competitive  setting,  using
capital to produce units of the consumption good.  Firms are price-takers in the market for the
capital input so that profit  maximization yields the condition that r, = f(.)  - (1-6), where is the
rental price of capital.
The nominal stock of fiat money at date t is simply the sum of money balances  existing
last period and date-t transfers; that is, lq  = n\.r  *  t,.  Finally, let money grow according to the
policy rule r\  :Onr,-,.  Government spending is simply the quantity of monetary transfers.
Equation (2) is the agent's  date-t  budger  constraint. Ourput produced  in period t plus
the real value of money balances  finance purchases  of the consumption good, (net) investment
spending, and money balances  carried over into next period.  Equation (3) is the cash-in-advance
constraint.  Money balances  are n@essary  to purchase  rhe consumption good and for net
additions to the physical capital stock.
The maximization problem can be conveniently written as the value function:
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Next, form the Lagrangean  with multipliers tr",  and \.3  The first-order  conditions  for the Kuhn-
Tucker problem are then
U'(c,)  =Lr,r\, a
P4(.,-')=l',*t1\,
t!-r,-r11*,,,-(l-s)ft,)]\,=0 withl.l>o,7,,>0  .  (10)
P
3 Throughout this paper, I will adopt the Stockman's conventions with regard to
representing  the value  function. Here, q  is the exogenous  state  vadable,  while k  is an
endogenous  state  variable  and I  is a decision  variable  such  that the system  is fully described  by
these three arguments.There are two market-clearing conditions; namely, all nominal money balances  clear and the
goods  market clears. Formally,  ffid,  :  tr\ and cr + lq., - (lS)q  :  f0q) Vt>0.
An equilibrium in this economy  is a sequence  of prices {P,, r,}, real allocations  {q, Iq*,,
rn!P,),  and money growth rates {0,} such that
(i)  Given pric€s and the rate of money growth, the real allocation solves  the
household's  maximization  problem  represented  by (l)  - (3);
(ii)  Given prices and the rate of money growth, the allocations solve the firm's
date-t maximization problem;
(iii)  the market clearing conditions are satisfied.
The necessary  conditions  for this equilibrium are then given  by equations  (7) - (10).
3. The reserve requirement model
In this section, I describe an alternative model in which a simple bank structure is
introduced.a The banks must hold a fraction of their deposits in the form of fiat money
balances. The question is how this envirorunent differs from the "pure" cash-in-advance  senrp
described  above.
The household's  objective  is to maximize  the sum  of discounted  utilities in which
consumption is the sole argument.  Also, firms have access  to the same  production technology,
'See Smith (1991)  for an alternative  interpretation  of the reserve  requirement  restriction.
1captured  by the function f(.).  There is an additional  reason  for holding  money  in this economy.
Agent's must hold fiat money balances  in order to purchase  the consumption. As will seen later,
this hybrid model facilitates comparison with the cash-in-advance  model.  The focus of the
difference then will be that fiat money is not necessary  to make net additions to the physical
capital stock.  The key feature of the model with a reserve requirement is to uncover what the
restriction means in terms of modelling the relationship between fiat money and capital good
purchases.
To motivate the banking structure, I assume  that there is a minimum size for capital
good purchases. More importantly  for my purpose, the minimum purchase size is larger than
the maximum saving by individual agents. This form of capital illiquidity  is circumvented by
introducing banks that pool together the funds from small savers  to purchase  the capital good.
Agents deposit goods in the bank.  The bank then purchases  either units of the capital good
holds fiat money.  Banks can perform this function at zero marginal cost and the banking
industry is perfectly competitive.  To maximize profits, the bank will offer a return on deposits,
denoted ql, that is equal to the return on its portfolio.
At the end of date t-1, the banks' balance sheet identity is captured by the expression  4
:  r,-rlP,.r + h, where d is the quantity of deposits per agent and r is the nominal quantity of fiat
money  (reserves)  held by the bank. Thus,  the real value  of deposits  is equal  to the sum  of the
capital good and the real value of bank reserves.5  I focus on equilibrium  in which capital rate-
of-retum dominates fiat money.  To ensure that banks will hold fiat money, a reserue
requirement  is imposed;  that is, r,_r/Pr-r  > L-,d,,  where  y is the reserve  requirement  ratio.  Note
'The  date-t  deposits  were carried over from date t-1. Following  the convention  in
Stockman, the end-of-period nominal quantity of fiat money is denoted with the subscript r-1,
whereas capital carried over to date t is denoted with subscript r.  Similarly, I am assuming  that
capital goods purchased last period generate income via the production technology in the
current period. Moreover, the salvage  value  of capital  is its undepreciated  value.that the real value of deposits can be affected by movements in the price level between date t-1
and date t. Moreover, for cases  in which the retum on physical capital rate of return dominates
fiat money, the reserve requirement constraint is binding and the bank's balance sheet
expression  then implies  that
lc < (l-y'.,)4.  (11)
From the reserve requirement constfaint, deposits can be written as
4 < r,.,/(%-,P,.,).  (12)
To express  the relationship between the capital stock and bank reserves,  substitute (12) into
(11),  and use  the banks'balance  sheet  identity to obtain
What (13) tells us is that the reserve requirement forces banla to (at least partially) back capital
goods purchases  with fiat money.
In this setup, the total stock of fiat money is equal to the sum of currency, denoted s,
and bank resewes; that is, r\  = st +  rr  The agents  budget constraint is written as
,.  -  l-l  n,  r.,
"'-  y^ v:'




Using equation  (13), one can rewrite the budget  constraint  asflq *'-;,"'
(14')








The maximization problem is written as the value function
V(s,,k,P,)  =  max  U(c,) + pV(s,.uk,.uP,r)
t " t,,,  r,.  J
subject  to (14') and (15). Next, form the Lagrangean  with multipliers lrr and !b corresponding  to
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with {.}  , p", }  0.  In addition, there are two market clearing conditionSi md,  :  rq and q+  (.,  -
(1-6)lq  :  (k).
An equilibrium in this economy  is a sequence  of prices  {R, E,  q}, real allocations  {q,
4.,),  and monetary  policy variables  {0,,y,}  such  that
(i) Given prices  and the monetary  policy  variables,  the re3l allocation  solves  the
household's  meximization  problem represented  by (1), and (14') and (15);
(ii)  Given prices and the monetary policy variables, the allocations solve the
firms's date-t Drofit maximization problem:
(iii)  Given prices and the monetary policy variables, the allocations solve the
bank's date-t profit  maximization problem;
(iv) the market clearing conditions are satisfied.
(1e)
(20) [f-",]u,,=o
llThe necessary  conditions  for this equilibrium are then given  by equations  (17)-(20).
Now that equilibrium  has been characterized for the two monetary environments, I ask if
the two economies  are equivalent.  Note that the condition for market clearing implies that if
the capital  stock  paths  are identical,  so willthe  consumption  paths. I first coruider a version  of
equivalence in which I compare directly the first-order conditions.  The models are equivalent if
the firsi-order conditions  can  be written as  a set  of identical  expressions.  For this t]?e of
"model" equivalence to hold, the conditions are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The cash-in-advance  and reserve'requirement models have identical first-order
conditions  ift  p"r,  + p,, /(l-y)and  n(q-, - (l{)lq)  * 0.
Proof:  Clearly, if the 'first-order conditions are identical, the two models will generate identical
paths  for both allocations  and prices.
Note that (7)-(8) and equations  (17)-(18)  are exactly  alike. A comparison  of equations
(9) with (19) shows  that with 1 = l/(1+l)  then there rwo first-order  conditions  are identical.
Equations (10) and (20) are identical if either there is no cash-in-advance  constraint against
gross investment spending or if gross investment spending  is zero.  Thus, with these two
conditions, the first-order conditions from the cash-in-advance  model are identical to those
expressions  obtained from the reserve-requirement model.!
With  identical first-order conditions, the equilibrium allocations and prices will naturally
be identical  for any given  value  of the inflation rate. The expressions  in equations  (7)-(10)  are
quite similar to equations  (17>(20). Indeed,  if the conditions  in Proposition  t hold, the cash-in-
advance  and reserve-requirement models are identical for a particular value of the reserve
l2requirement  ratio.  Of course,  the value  of the ratio depends  on q.
The question then is whether there a feature in either or both of the economies  that
implies  the two Proposition-l conditions  will be satisfied. The answer  is no. With or without I
:  0, it would be sheer coincidence for the two independent conditions identified in Proposition
I to be satisfied. Indeed,  in a steady  state  with lq*r = lq > 0, the zero-gross-investment
condition  will not hold. Consequently,  for any  r1 > 0, the conditions  will certainly  not hold. At
most, therefore, one would say that satisfying these two independent conditions would be sheer
coincidence along a transition path.
Proposition 1 offers an insight into the key differenc€ between the two monetary
economies. In particular, equations (9) and (19) differ primarily because  there is a difference in
the timing of the relationship between fiat money and capital good purchases. In (9), the
marginal indirect utility  of capital is equal to the sum of two shadow  prices: one corresponds to
an additional unit  of income and the other to an additional unit of fiat money balances. As (19)
shows,  however, only the shadow pric€ of an additional unit of income is present in the reserve-
requirement model.  In the cash-in-advance  model, the agent forgoes consumption at date t to
acquire money balances. The money balances  can be used to purchase either the consumption
good  or the capital  good at date t.  Capital goods  become  productive  at date t+1.  In contrast,
the reserve requirement model dictates that money balances  are acquired simultaneously with
the capital good.  Thus, in the reserve requirement model, the money balances  required to
purchase the capital good are tied up for only one period before the gains from such purchases
are realized.  In contrast, one must wait two periods before fiat money acquisition and the gains
from the capital purchase are realized in the model in which the cash-in-advance  constraint is
present.
Note that model equivalence is a rather strong notion for comparing two model
t3economies. If model equivalence  did hold, then orte could obtain identical steady-state
allocations from the two monetary environments by simply picking the appropriate value for the
reserve requirement ratio.  In the next section, I consider a somewhat weaker notion of
equivalence. As you will see,  the question amounts to whether there exists a combination of the
reserve requirement ratio and the inflation  rate that yields identical allocations.6
4.  Equivalence with policy combinations
In both monetary economies,  fiat money is required to puchase capital.  Is there a
combination policy defined as value of the reserve requirement and inflation  rate such that the
two models yield identical steady-state  allocations?  Here, I derive the analytic solutions for
steady-state  capital for both model economies. I refer to this notion of equivalence  as allocation
equivalence.
The expression  for steady-state  capital in the cash-in-advance  model is given by the
followins:
q(l+e)[1  -B(1  -6)]
Equation (21) is a reduced-form  representation  of the first-order  condition in which  the
marginal value of an additional unit of capital is equal to the marginal costs. The marginal costs
'Koenig  (1987)  examines  the dynamic  behavior  of the Stocknan model. Koenig finds  that a
short-run Tobin effect will arise as agents respond to high nominal interest rates, provided that
net investment purchases  are not subject to a "full "  cash-in-advance  constraint.  In short, if as in
the Sidrauski (1967) model, investmenr goods can be purchased  with cuuent period earnings,
there will be a positive correlation between saving,  investment, and the nominal interest rate,
where movements in the interest rate reflects changes  in the rate of money growth.
t4
.  I  -h
ft(k '\  =  '  't  + p Ql) p'arise because  the agent forgoes today's consumption. Note that the agent's time rate of
preference  is squared  in (21), reflecting  the two-period  gap  between  when  one acquires  a unit of
fiat money spent on capital and the actual output gains are realized.
The steady-state  value of capital in the reserve requirement model solves  the following
expression
(see  Appendix gA.l for the derivarion  ot (22\\.7
From equations (21) and (22), the steady-state  capital stocks are equal for the two
alternative models if
I'@')  =(t  . 
+)i 
-  (r-6)  -  -l-r Q2)
l-l  * n(i+0)[1  -P(l-6)] 
=11 *  y11  _(r_6)  _  y  1.  (23)
P  92 
'  l-y  F  l-yO
' The following proposition characterizes  steady-state  allocations in terms of the inflation  rate and
the reserve requirement ratio.
Propoeition 2:  For a givm inllation  rate, there exists e value of the reserve requirement ratio
such that the steady{tate  levels of capital (and implicitly  consurnption) are identical for the
?  It  is straightforward to show that the steady-state  value of capital is also inversely related
to changes  in the reserve  requirement. l-et yl(l-y)  = O. From (24),  dl/d$  :  (1/P - 1/0yf'(.).
With 0 < B <  1, dldd$  < 0.  It follows from the definition  of g that it is positively related to T. 
-
Hence,  dk/dy is negative.cash-in-advance  and reserve requirernent models.
Proof:  The proof is done indirectly.  I look at the steady-state  capital levels with the (eserve
requirement ratios at its two extreme values. With  these boundaries established,  the proof is
completed by characterizing the effects that changes  in reserve requirements would have on
steady-state  capital.
With 0 < 9,6  < I, equation  (21) yields  an interior solution  for steady-state  capital  in the
cash-in-advance  constraint model.  Consider the case  with T = 0.  From equation (22), the right-
hand-side becomes 1/F - 1 + 6 in this economy. It  is straightforward to show t}tat the right-
hand-side  of equation  (21) is greater  than the l/B - I  + 6. With diminishing  marginal  product.
of capital, k" < k  with a zero reserve requirement ratio.
Next,  consider  the case  in which  y :  L  Here,.capital  is completely  crowded  so that lC >
IC  when the reserve requirement ratio equals l.
Lastly, I need to show that the steady-state  level of capital monotonically decreases  in
response  to an increase in the reserve requirement ratio.  kt  0 :  y/(l-y).  From equation (22),
dldd$:(1/F-l/e)f'(.).  Withe>p,dlddQ <0.Clearly,d$/dyis>0,sothatdk/dy  <0.
From (22), this value of the reserve requirement ratio will change as the inflation  rate changes.
Thus, there is a combination of monetary policy parameters such that one can obtain the
identical steady-state  level of capital in the model with a cash-in-advance  constraint as in the
reserve-requirement  model.I
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the two alternative monetary environments can generate.
identical steady-state  allocations and prices by selecting the two policy variables. Though there
16is not a single value of the reserve requirement ratio that yields equivalent allocations, there is a
unique combination of the inflation  rate and reserve requirement ratio that will result in
identical  allocations.
What is interesting is that the method of proof in Proposition 2 has some implications
for a more general class  of models than just those with a cash-in-advance  conshaint.  Note that
with y :  0, the steady-state  version of capital would be identical to that obtained in a non-
monetary enviroffnent  if the cash-in-advance  constraint on the consumption good were omitted.
Also, with y :  1, capital is completely crowded out in the reserve-requirement model [one can
see this from equation (13)1. Let lC'denote the steady-state  level of capital from a monetary
model with inflation  rate, ro.  The proof of Proposition 2 implies that there exists T0  € [0,1] such
that the policy combination (no,y) such that the reserve-requirement economy will obtain lC,.
A simple numerical example shows  the combinations of the inflation  rate and reserve
requirement that yield the same steady-state  levels of capital.  To implement this example,  I use
a Cobb-Douglas production technology; that is, f(k)  = l€.E The parameter settings used in this
numerical  exercise  are as  follows:  cr = 0.35;  F :  0.99;  and 5 :  0.02. In addition,  I need  to
specify the fraction of gross invesffnent spending that requires cash-in-advance. Following
Stocknan,  I consider  one case  in which  I  =  1.0. Calibrating  the simulation  with a 100%  cash-
in-advance constraint applied to gross investment may seems  a bit unsupported by the data,
especially if one interprets m in the model as high-powered money.e Consequently,  I also use n
8I cruld include  a scale  parameter  (total factor productivity  variable)  to the production
technology. As the reader will see,  I am interested in comparisons of levels, not the levels
themselves,  rendering the total factor productivity term unimportant  for the computational
experiments.
e If one wanted to calibrate the model to account for, say,  business  cycle facts, then
compensating  balances  and retained earnings stored in liquid financial assets  would be the
corresponding  "money"  that applies  to the cash-in-advance  constraint.
LI= 0.05  as a parameter  setting. Arguably,  even  this value  is too large. The key value  of this
numerical exercise  is to illustrate the set of policy combinations that yield identical steady-state
level  of capital.
Figure 1 plots the value of the reserve requirement ratio and inflation  rate that results in
the same level of steady-state  capital in the reserve-requirement model as in the model with a
cash-in-advance  constraint.  Note that the slope of the line is negative. As the inflation rate
rises,  the reserve  requirement  rutio falls. The intuition behind  this result  is straightforward.
First, recall the Stockman effect; that is, the steady-state  capital stock is inversely related to
movements in the inflation  rate.  This effect in present in both models.  If the size of the
Stockman effect is grster  (smaller) in the reserve-requirement model then the reserve
requirement ratio must decrease  (increase).  In the reserve-requirement model, the inflation
rate and reserve requirement ratio affect the agent's saving decision through the return on
deposits,  which is expressed  as
* (1  -T)0r  i(.)  +(1  -6).
Equation (Z)  indicates that the impact that an increase in inflation  rate has on the deposit rate
depends  on the size  of the reserve  requirement  ratio.  Thus,  one can infer from the negative
slope of the inflation  rate-reserve requirement locus that the inflation-rate  effect on steady srare
capital is larger in the reserve requirement model than in the model with the cash-in-advance
constraint.  Differences in the parameter settings would obviously affect the slope of the locus.
5. Seignorage  revenue eouivalence
The results reported above focus on finding identical steady-state  allocations and price
t
QAl
18paths for the two altemative monetary economies. The analysis  omits goverffnent  revenue
considerations. In lhis section, equivalence is extended to consider seignorage  revenues  in the
steady state.  Specifically, is there a combination policy that holds revenue constant across  the
two models and also obtains identical allocations?
A general  expression  for seignorage  revenue  is
Qs')
Given the monetary policy rule, one can rewrite the seignorage  revenue expression  as
where equation (25') is useful for distinguishing between changes  in the tax base (rq/P)  from
the rax rate (1 - 1/0).
. In comparing the seignorage  revenue outcomes from the cash-in-advance  and reserve-
requirement models, note that the models differ  only in terms of the tax base. From the cash-




while the tax base from the reserve-requirement model is given by
|w,-*,-,1
frr -  dr
Q6)
l91 =  xr,.l  .  tfr -olr'. (27)
We know that there exists an infinite  number of combination policies that will result in the two
monetary economies  yielding the same value of steady-state  capital.  As we shall see,  imposing
seignorage  revenue constancy  across  the cash-in-advance  and reserve-requirement economies
will dramatically reduces  the set of policy combinations.
Proposition 3:  The amount of seignorage  revenue raised in the model with the cash.in-advance
constraint will  be equal to that raised in the model with r.eserve  requirements ift  e =  1 or y =
6(l +6).
Proof: With 0:  l,the  inflation tax rate is zero,  hence  seignorage  revenue  is zero in both
models if money stock is held constant across  time.  There is also a reserve requirement ratio
that equates the tax base across  the two economies. This requires that the second-term in
equltion  (27) equals zero.  It  is straightfontrard to show that this condition is satisfted when y =
6(l+6).tr
Proposition 3 identifies the necessary  conditions for the two monetary enviroffnents to
generate the value of steady-state  seignorage  revenues. With  a constant money supply, there is
a single value of the reserve requirement ratio that ensures  equivalence in the steady-state
allocations.  If the reserve requirement is fixed so that the tax bases  are identical across  tne rwo
monetary economies,  there are two values of the inflation  rate that yield equivalent steady-stare
allocations. (Equation (23) is a quadratic  expression  in the inflation rate.)
20Table I reports the policy combinarions that satisfy this broadened definition  of
equivalence. I use the same parameters settings here as in the computational experiments
above. The results  reported  in the top half of Table 1 look at the value  of the reserve
requirement for various values of q.  With  such a low inflation  rate, the computational
experiment indicates that the reserve requirement that yields identical steady-state  allocations is
around 75% when there is a 100% cash-in-advance  applied against capital purchases. The
reserve requirement goes to around 98% when the ratio of fiat money to capital is 50% of gross
investment spending or below
The bottom half of Table 1 reports the two values of the inllation  rate that generates
identical steady-state  allocations when the reserve requirement ratio is chosen  to ensure the
same tax bases  constant across  the two monetary environments.  If calibrated to business  cycle
frequency, the reserve requirement ratio is slightly below 2%.  For example, Table I reports that
with rl  =  1.0,the inflation  rate that satisfies allocation and seignorage-revenue  equivalence
would be -92%.
6. Discussion
In this paper, I show that one can obtain the same steady-state  allocation of capital and
consumption in two different monetary economies: a cash-in-advance  model and a reserve-
requirement model.  A model with a cash-in-advance  constraint differs from a reserve-
requirement model in one meaningful way: timing.  More specifically, the cash-in-advance  model
maintains that fiat money required to purchase capital goods is effectively idle for two periods
before it is transformed into more of the consumption good via the production technology. In
contrast, the fiat money required to acquire capital in the reserve-requirement model waits only
one period before it is transformed into the consumption good.  The key result is that for a
2lgiven inflation  rate, denoted rro,  there is a steady-state  allocation obtained in a model with a
cash-in-advance  constraint.  One can obtain the same steady-state  level of capital in the reserve-
requirement provided that the reserve requirement ratio is chosen appropriately.  Thus, there is
a policy combination (no,yo)  which generates  equivalent steady-state  solutions to the cash-in-
advance  and reserve-requirement models.
Though I only investigate one pair of monetary environments, the reserve-requirement
model is equivalent to a broader class  of economies. In fact, the models may appear somewhat
rigged since I study economies in which there is a cash-in-advance  constraint on the
consumption good and fiat money is required to obtain capital.  The flexibility of the reserve
requirement model, however, means that equivalent allocations and seignorage  revenue is
actually quite easy  to obtain.  what  is important  is the combination of the inflation rate and
reserve requirement ratio.  For a given value of the inflation  rate, the reserve-requirement
model can obtain any value of steady-state  capital between zero and that level which would be
the solution in a non-monetary economy. The fact that steady-state  capital will lie between the
boundaries of zero and non-monetary upper bound means that one can find a combination of
the reserve requirement ratio and inflation  rate resulting in the identical steady-state  allocation
in the reserve-requirement model.  The additional policy parameter--the reserve requirement
ratio--adds an extra degree of freedom such that the policy combination amounts to finding two
values  to jointly solve  two independent  equations. consequently,  other monetary  environments--
such as those with spatially separated agents and shopping+ime models-will  also be equivalent
to the reserve-requirement model in the sense  that identical steady-state  allocations can be
obtained.
The set of policy combinations  that yield equivalent  steady-state  allocations  can also  be
extended  to consider  equivalent  levels  of seignorage  revenue. There are three  policy
22combinations that yield identical values for steady-state  capital and seignorage  revenue across
the cash-in-advance  and reserve-requirement models.  One policy combination is associated  with
a constant money stock such that the inflation  rate tax rate is zero.  One can also set the reserve
requirement ratio such that the seignorage  tax base is identical across  the two monetary
economies. Because  the steady-state  level of capital is a quadratic in the inllation  rate, there
will be two possible policy combinations that generate the same level of the inflation tax base
and capital.
In the introduction of this paper, I ask in what sense  are different monetary
environments equivalent.  The answer offered in this paper is that a model with reserve
requirements is equivalent to many monetary economies in the sense  of matching the steady-
state capital and seignorage  revenue. The reason behind the answer is the existence  of policy
combination--an inflation  rate-reserve requirement ratio pair-that  lets the reserve-requirement
model's solution vary between zero and an upper bound associated  with that found in a non-
monetary  setting.
This paper also identifies differences between the alternative monetary economies
studied here.  These differences are likely to produce differenee in out-of-steady-state  behavior.
While there are questions  for which a reserve-requirement  model is uniquely  best-suited,
obviously  future research  willjudge the merits of alternative  models  in terms of how well each
accounts  for observations  at business  cycle frequencies. What the current paper achieves  is
deriving the conditions that are necessary  for the reserve-requirement model to have the same
steady-state  allocations as many different  monetary economies. Thus, despite possessing
particllar  traits, the combination of the inflation  rate and reserve requirement ratio effectively
renders the reserve-requirement model equivalent to many alternative monetary models.
ZJAnnendix
1 Derivation of the expression  for steady-state  caoital
In the reserve requirement model, note that the indirect utilities  of money and capital
can be represented as
,,r.)  =  *uf,,r"  (A.1)
and
%(.)  =p,,tr,(.).(1  -s).+fr?l  @.2)
Update the expressions  in (A.f)  and (A.2) and substitute  into the first-order  conditions  to obtain
the Euler equations. Notably,
Fr,,,-,[f'(.)-(t-o-+r-?l  =  r,,  (1  "  fft 
(A.3)
B  Fu., * 0Il,'  = l''  (A.4) '  P*r  P,.,  P,
together  with (19) and (20).
In the steady state, assume  drat € and T are constant.  Further, consumption and thecapital  stock  are constant  in steady-state.  Then, f(.) :  c + 6k. It is possible  to deduce  that Fz  re
0 in the steady  state. In (A.2), p, :  0 if and only if, the Friedman  rule applies. I assume
throughout this analysis that e > F holds.  0  will show that in steady state the money growth
rate and inflation  rate are proportionate  next section of this appendix.)  This is the standard
conditions to ensure that the cash-in-advance  constraint is binding.
With F2  * 0 and with Frr :  Frr+r,  then (A.4) can  be written
f,(k,\= ti0 -rt-6)-g  (A.s) '80
where  $ = y/(l-y)  and 0 :  n :  P*,/P, insteady state.
Thus,  (26) is derived.
2. Steady-state  relationship between monev qrowth and inflation
With  F:,  *  0,
s,
'P, (4.6)
Recall, that e  = s, *  res,. In steady state, c = f(k)  - Ek. Using the expression  for steady-state
consumption and the date-t expression relating reserves  to capital, one can write
25m,  =  P,lflkl  *(:T  -6)&l  (A.7)
l-T
Update (A.7) one period and after cancelling tenns, the expression  is
fl, t,  -  Pu,
mt  P,
In steady  state,  therefore,  (A.8) implies  that 0 :  n.
(A.8)
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